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Abstract: Several recent studies have shown that, when fiscal and monetary authorities play a 
Stackelberg game, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces 
the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and 
output distortions, and lower macroeconomic variability. We show in this paper that, in a Nash 
equilibrium, the government is still disciplined by central bank opacity. However, the disciplining 
effect on the level and variability of inflation and the output gap is dominated by the direct effect 
of opacity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Central  bank  transparency  is  usually  studied  in  a  game  framework  focusing  on  the 
interactions  between  the  monetary  authority  and  the  private  sector.
1  Departing  from  this 
approach, several studies introduce monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Assuming that the 
government plays against the central bank as a Stackelberg leader, Ciccarone et al. (2007), and 
Hefeker and Zimmer (2011) have shown that uncertainty (or opacity) about the central bank’s 
“political” preference parameter could have a fiscal disciplining effect, inducing lower taxes and 
hence lower inflation and output distortions. It could also reduce the macroeconomic volatility if 
the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high. In a framework where productivity-enhancing 
public  investment  could  improve  future  growth  potential,  Dai  and  Sidiropoulos  (2011)  have 
reexamined the issue of central bank transparency in the Stackelberg equilibrium. They have 
shown that, when the public investment is highly productivity enhancing, the optimal choice of 
tax  rate  and  public  investment  eliminates  the  effects  of  distortionary  taxation  and  fully 
counterbalances  both  the  direct  and  fiscal-disciplining  effects  of  opacity,  on  the  level  and 
variability of inflation and the output gap. By considering the above sequential timing, these 
authors  agree  with  the  view  that  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium  concept  is  the  one  that  better 
captures fiscal and monetary policy interactions (Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma and 
Uhlig (1999)). 
However, important monetary and fiscal policy decisions could also occur simultaneously. 
For instance, one could notice that during severe recessions and/or financial crises – such as the 
                                                 
1 Following the seminal work of  Cukierman and Metzler (1986), a large theoretical and empirical literature on 
central bank transparency has been developed. See, for example, Nolan and Schaling (1998), Faust and Svensson 
(2001), Chortareas et al. (2002), Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007), among others. 
See Geraats (2002), and Eijffinger and van der Cruijsen (2010) for a survey of the literature.   3 
current  one  –  the  timing  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  may  well  diverge  from  that  of  a 
Stackelberg game between monetary and fiscal authorities. Under these circumstances, it may be 
reasonable to assume that monetary and fiscal policies are chosen at the same moment. This 
explains why many authors have considered the implications of non-coordinated monetary and 
fiscal  policy  interactions  in  a  Nash  game  (e.g.,  Alesina  and  Tabellini  (1987),  Beetsma  and 
Bovenberg (1997), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009), Di Bartolomeo and 
Giuli (2011) among others). 
Hughes  Hallett  and  Viegi  (2003)  have  considered  the  implications  of  central  bank 
transparency in a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities, both concerned with taxes. 
The fiscal disciplining effect is somewhat present in their model but is not highlighted by the 
authors.  Moreover,  in  opposite  to  the  above  studies  on  the  fiscal  disciplining  effect  in  the 
Stackelberg  equilibrium,  they  consider  that  uncertainty  is  only  associated  with  the  weight 
attached  to  the  output  gap.  This  might  induce  arbitrary  economic  effects  of  central  bank 
preference uncertainty (Beetsma and Jensen, 2003) because a small change in the uncertainty 
specification (e.g., putting the stochastic parameter in the front of one of the two arguments of the 
central bank’s objective function) can lead to radically different effects.  
This paper contributes to the literature on central bank transparency by clarifying the issue of 
fiscal disciplining effect in a Nash equilibrium using a framework similar to Ciccarone et al. 
(2007) and Hefeker and Zimmer (2011), with uncertainty affecting both weights allotted to the 
output and inflation stabilization. The objective of the paper is to show how a change in the game 
structure could affect the importance of fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. 
Section 3 presents the Stackelberg equilibrium. Section 4 examines the effect of opacity in the 
Nash equilibrium. The last section summarizes our findings.   4 
 
2. The model  
 
We consider a representative competitive firm which chooses labor to maximize profits by taking 
as given the prices (or the inflation rate p ), the wages (and so expected inflation 
e p ) and tax rate 
(t ) on the firm’s revenue, subject to a production technology. The normalized supply function 
incorporating the effects of distortionary taxes is: 
t p p - - =
e x ,                (1) 
where  x  (in log terms) represents the output gap. Equation (1) is a Lucas’s supply  function 
extended by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) to take account of distortionary taxes on the output. We 
notice  that  τ  allows  covering  a  whole  range  of  structural  reforms,  such  as  non-wage  costs 
associated with social security (or job protection legislation), the pressures caused by tax or wage 
competition  on  a  regional  basis  or  the  more  general  effects  of  supply-side  deregulation 
(Demertzis et al. (2004)). 
The fiscal authority is concerned with the stabilization of inflation and output gap fluctuations 
around a zero target and the stabilization of public expenditures  g  (expressed as a percentage of 
the output) around a target g . Its loss function is 





1 g g x L
G - + + = d p d ,            (2) 
where  E is an operator of mathematical expectations,  1 d  and  2 d  are the weights assigned to the 
stabilization of inflation and public expenditures respectively. The weight assigned to the output-
gap stabilization is unity. The public expenditures are composed of public sector consumption, 
i.e. public sector wages, current public spending on goods and other government spending. They 
are assumed to yield immediate utility to the government and have no incidence on the output   5 
supply. The government minimizes (2) subject to the budget constraint excluding seigniorage 
revenue and public debt:
  
t = g .                   (3) 
Retaining the control of fiscal instruments, the government delegates the conduct of monetary 
policy to the central bank. The latter sets its policy to minimize the loss function 




CB e p e m + + - = ,  0 > m ,         (4)     
where m  is the expected relative weight that the central bank assigns to the inflation stabilization 
and it could be different from  1 d . Larger (small) values of  m  signify that the central bank is 
relatively conservative (liberal or populist) in the sense of Rogoff (1985).  
The central bank does not make full disclosure about the weights assigned to the inflation and 
output-gap stabilization, meaning that  e  is  a stochastic variable for the  government  and the 
private  sector.  The  distribution  of  e   is  characterized  by  0 ) ( = E e , 
2 2) ( ) var( e s e e = E =   and 
] , 1 [ m e - Î . A higher variance 
2
e s  represents a higher degree of central bank political opacity. 
The case where the central bank is completely predictable and hence completely transparent is 
represented by  0
2 = e s . Given that  0 ) ( = E e  and  ] , 1 [ m e - Î , 
2
e s  has an upper bound so that 
] , 0 [
2 m se Î  (Ciccarone et al., 2007). 
 
3. The Stackelberg equilibrium  
 
To put into evidence the fiscal disciplining effect in the Nash equilibrium compared with that 
in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we synthetize in this section the benchmark model of Hefeker and 
Zimmer’s (2011).    6 
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms inflation expectations, 
e p , then the government sets fiscal policy, t , and lastly the central bank makes monetary policy 
decision,  p . The private sector, composed of atomistic agents, plays a Nash game against the 
central bank. The government plays against the central bank as a Stackelberg leader. 
 The game is solved backwards. The minimization of (4) subject to (1) leads to the central 
bank’s reaction function:  








) )( 1 (
e
.                (5) 
The budget constraint (3) implies that the government has only one free instrument to choose 
between  t   and g .  Assume  that  the  government  uses  t   as  policy  instrument  and  sets  it  to 
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Substituting t  given by (6) into (5) and imposing rational expectations yield: 
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g e .          (7)  
Using (1),  (3) and (5)-(7), we solve for  p ,  x ,  t ,  g , and the variance of  p   and  x  at  the 
Stackelberg equilibrium denoted by an upper index “s”: 
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S S .      (11) 
The denominator of (8)-(11) increases with 
2
e s , the numerator of (8)-(10) is invariant with 
2
e s  
while the numerator of (11) increases with 
2
e s . Thus, an increase in 
2
e s  reduces 
S p , 
S t  and 
S g , 
leading to higher 
S x  (lower output distortions) since  0 ) ( < -m e . In effect, output distortions due 
to taxes destined to finance public expenditures imply higher expected and current inflation, and 
lower output gap. The government perceives that marginal costs associated with higher taxes are 
higher when  the  central bank is  more opaque.  Brainard’s (1967) conservatism  principle  will 
guide the government to adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy (“disciplining effect”). This stance 
of fiscal policy leads to lower inflation and higher output gap at the cost of larger deviation of 
public expenditures from their target. 
Opacity triggers two opposing effects on macroeconomic volatility. The fiscal disciplining 
effect of opacity, by lowering 
S t , 
S g  and 
S p  (and increasing 
S x ), implies lower  ) var(
S p  and 
) var(
S x . It acts on the common denominator of (8)-(11). The direct effect of opacity reflects the 
impact  of  the  realization  of  e   on  inflation  and  the  output  gap.  The  shock  e   enters  in  the 
numerator  of  (8)-(9),  implying  that 
2
e s   affects  the  numerator  of  (11).  The  direct  and  fiscal 
disciplining  effects  of  opacity  on  macroeconomic  variability  are  respectively  defined  by  the 
derivative of  ) var(
S p  with respect to 
2
e s  present in the numerator and the denominator of (11): 
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.   8 
The fiscal disciplining effect can more than counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the 






) 1 ( 2
d
d m m m d
e s +
+ + + >  and vice versa (Hefeker and Zimmer (2010)). The fiscal disciplining effect is 
more likely to induce a decrease in the macroeconomic volatility if the central bank is less averse 
to inflation (i.e., smaller  m ) and the government less concerned with the public expenditures 
deviations (i.e., smaller  2 d ). In mathematical terms, given the upper bound on 
2
e s  (i.e., m se <
2 ), 
the  previous  lower  bound  on 
2
e s   is  valid  only  when  m d
m m d d m < +
+ + +
) 1 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1
2 ( ,  implying  that 
) 1 (






d m m d d
+
+ - + < . If the latter conditions are reversed, the direct effect of opacity will always 
dominate the fiscal disciplining effect (Dai and Sidiropoulos (2011)).  
 
4. The Nash equilibrium 
 
The  previous  findings  are  based  on  the  Stackelberg  game  between  fiscal  and  monetary 
authorities. Such a game is justified if the government sets its fiscal policy once at the beginning 
of a period and the central bank makes monetary policy decisions during the period. However, 
important  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  decisions  could  also  occur  simultaneously  as  we  can 
observe in the current global financial and economic crisis. Allowing the fiscal and monetary 
authorities to move simultaneously in a Nash game, we can examine how a modification in the 
timing of the strategic game could affect the effects of opacity.  
For simplicity, we retain the balanced-budget assumption for the Nash game. We remark 
that, according to Hefeker and Zimmer (2011), the balanced-budget assumption can be justified 
when the scope is a long- to medium-term analysis. However, in a short-term Nash game, this   9 
assumption can be justified on the ground that the monetary authority is independent of the fiscal 
authority (limiting hence the money financing of the public deficit) and the latter could be limited 
by a fiscal rule or debt ceiling which makes the bond financing of the public deficit unlikely.
2 
The  timing  of  the  game  is  the  following.  First,  the  private  sector  forms 
e p ,  then 
simultaneously, the government sets t  and the central bank chooses p . The government and the 
central bank play a Nash game. The game is solved by backward induction. Rational private 
sector will realize that the final outcomes will emerge from a solution combining the optimal 
reaction functions of both fiscal and monetary authorities and the expected inflation rate that 
these reaction functions imply. 
Minimizing (4) subject to (1) leads to the central bank’s reaction function which is the same 
as (5). Taking 
e p  and  p  as given, the government minimizes (2) subject to (1) and (3) and 
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Solving (5) and (12) for p  and t  in terms of 
e p  and  g  yields 
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Imposing rational expectations by taking mathematical expectations of (13), we obtain: 
g
e







= .                 (15) 
                                                 
2 An extension of the model to take account of bond and money financing of the public deficit could be indeed very 
interesting.  The  presence  of  public  debt  and  seigniorage  revenue  could  considerably  complicate  the  results  by 
introducing the dynamics due to the accumulation of public debt and the interaction between the effects of opacity on 
seigniorage revenue and fiscal decisions. As a first approach, we want to provide some clear-cut analytical results 
which allow comparing the effects of opacity at Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium.   10 
where 
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+ + » E = W  is a second-order Taylor approximation. 
Using (1), (3) and (12)-(15) yields the Nash equilibrium solutions denoted by an upper index 
“N”: 
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where the second-order Taylor approximation is used to obtain (19). Deriving (16)-(19) with 
respect to 
2
e s  gives
3  
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3 We can decompose as before the direct and fiscal disciplining effects of opacity on  ) var(
N p  and  ) var(
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Higher  opacity  induces  higher 
N p   and  lower 
N x   (higher  output  distortions).  It  affects 
negatively 
N t . The fiscal disciplining effect is present in the Nash equilibrium and induces a 
lower 
N t , while being unable to counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on 
N p  and 
N x .  
We remark that in (16)-(19), when  ) 1 ( 2 d W -  tends to zero, 
N p , 
N x  and 
N t  could tend to 
¥ +  and  ¥ -  while  ) var(
N p  and  ) var(
N x  approach  ¥ + . Under full transparency, we have 
0 ) 1 ( 2 > W - d  and  0 >
N p . Higher opacity leads to higher 
N p , with the latter approaching  ¥ +  
when 
2
e s  increases in the way that  + ® W - 0 ) 1 ( 2 d . Then, a slight increase in 
2
e s  could turn 
N p  
from  ¥ +  to  ¥ - . The predictions of the model just before and after that the term  ) 1 ( 2 d W -  
changes sign are implausible and this could be explained by that the Taylor approximation works 
only  with  small  deviations.  To  avoid  that,  we  impose  0 ) 1 ( 2 > W - d ,  i.e.  ) 1 (
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same  than  the  condition  which  ensures  that  an  increase  in 
2
e s   induces  higher  ) var(
N p   and 
) var(
N x .  Given  the  above  discussion,  we  exclude  the  possibility  ) 1 (
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.  Therefore,  contrary  to  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium,  the  fiscal   12 
disciplining effect cannot counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the volatility of inflation 
and the output gap. 
The above  findings  could  be  explained by the  absence of any  commitment made by the 
government in the Nash game. Its non-cooperative behaviour will lead the central bank to doubt 
if opacity has any fiscal disciplining effect on the government’s decisions. Thus, the government 
will not have incentive to restrict as less as possible public expenditures and taxes. In other 
words, Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle which implies that the government is incited to 
adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy under central bank opacity is not likely to play an important 
role in  guiding the government’s actions in the Nash equilibrium even though the perceived 
marginal costs associated with higher taxes are higher. Therefore, as the fiscal disciplining effect 




In this paper, we have shown that the fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity, which 
can significantly affect the macroeconomic performance and volatility in the framework where 
the government and the central bank act respectively as Stackelberg leader and follower, could 
become insignificant when these two authorities play a Nash game. At the Nash equilibrium, an 
increase in the degree of central bank opacity will always induce a higher inflation, a lower 
output gap and a higher macroeconomic volatility, despite the existence of fiscal disciplining 
effect. These results are independent of the initial degree of central bank opacity, in opposite to 
the Stackelberg equilibrium.    13 
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